

V-tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in VANETs

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Abstract—Privacy is an important requirement in vehicle networks, because vehicles broadcast detailed location information. Also of importance is accountability due to safety critical applications. Conditional pseudonymity, i.e., usage of resolvable pseudonyms, is a common approach to address both. Often, resolvability of pseudonyms is achieved by authorities maintaining pseudonym-identity mappings. However, these mappings are privacy sensitive and require strong protection to prevent abuse or leakage. We present a new approach that does not rely on pseudonym-identity mappings to be stored by any party. Resolution information is directly embedded in pseudonyms and can only be accessed when multiple authorities cooperate. Our privacy-preserving pseudonym issuance protocol ensures that pseudonyms contain valid resolution information but prevents issuing authorities from creating pseudonym-identity mappings.

I. INTRODUCTION

In inter-vehicular networks, also known as VANETs, wireless communication between vehicles facilitates cooperative applications enhancing road safety, traffic efficiency, and driving convenience. Collision avoidance, real-time traffic information, lane merge assistance, and accident warnings are some of the envisioned applications. It is generally agreed that security and privacy are mandatory requirements for the deployment of VANETs. As a practical security approach, the management of vehicle IDs and authentication by digital signatures and public key certificates is proposed by research projects [1] and standardization efforts [2]. Privacy issues arise from frequent dissemination of beacon messages that contain detailed vehicle-related information (e.g., position, speed, heading), which can be abused for tracking and profiling of individuals. However, solving it is a challenging task because privacy approaches for VANETs are constrained by network characteristics and security requirements [3].

One often proposed solution are frequently changing pseudonyms [1]. Here, a pseudonym is a public key certificate which does not contain information linking it to a vehicle, driver, or other pseudonyms. But accountability may be desired to evict misbehaving nodes or assign liability after fatal accidents. So some authorities must be able to resolve pseudonyms to vehicle identities in certain situations. Therefore, only conditional pseudonymity should be provided in VANETs.

The pseudonym lifecycle consists of several phases: During *pseudonym issuance*, a vehicle obtains pseudonyms from a certificate authority (CA). In the process, the vehicle needs to authenticate and resolution information needs to be created. *Pseudonym usage* is a vehicle’s use of pseudonyms to authenticate messages in communication with other vehicles and infrastructure nodes. If required, some authorities may

perform *identity resolution* to trace a pseudonym back to an identity by using information retained in the first step. *Revocation* is an optional step, in which a vehicle’s identity and pseudonyms can be revoked to exclude it from participating in the network. To mitigate scalability issues, a vehicle can be revoked passively, i.e., only its identity is revoked while the vehicle can still participate in the network until its current pseudonyms expire, but it cannot acquire new pseudonyms.

Conditional pseudonymity provides privacy for vehicles and also accountability. However, vehicles have to trust pseudonym issuing authorities to store and manage resolution information securely and responsibly. If resolution information leaks or becomes openly available, the privacy protection provided by pseudonyms is undermined. We propose to reconsider the common assumption that authorities can be fully trusted with managing information that could render privacy mechanisms ineffective. Instead, authorities should follow the principles of *minimum disclosure* and *separation of concerns*. Only entities responsible for identity resolution should be able to access resolution information while other entities, like pseudonym issuance authorities, should neither store nor have access to it. This raises several questions in the VANET context: How can accountability be achieved without entrusting pseudonym issuing authorities with resolution information? How can it be ensured that resolution information can only be used in legitimate situations by a specific authorities? And to what extend should linking information be released then?

In this work, we propose a new approach for conditional pseudonymity in VANETs that addresses these questions. Our approach achieves accountability without requiring authorities to store resolution information and prevents them from keeping it. As a result, drivers have to place less trust in authorities. The scheme also benefits authorities by helping them comply with privacy regulations and reducing the amount of sensitive information to be managed. Further, we enforce the cooperation of several authorities for pseudonym-identity resolution to ensure multiple parties agreeing on necessity for resolution. The resolution protocol also provides *perfect forward privacy* [3], i.e., only linking information for the current pseudonym is made available while other pseudonyms and messages of that user remain unlinkable. Next, we discuss related work (Sec. II) and the system model (Sec. III), before presenting and analyzing our approach (Sec. IV, V).

II. RELATED WORK

Privacy and pseudonymity have been discussed in many research projects like PRIME and there are resulting frame-

works like Idemix¹. However, they are focusing mainly on Internet-like scenarios that are very different from the VANET scenarios we are considering herein. Privacy protection is generally considered mandatory for successful VANET deployment. Most approaches are based on pseudonyms with identity resolution as proposed by major research projects like SeVeCom² or PREDRIVE-C2X³ and standardization efforts, e.g., carried out by ETSI TC ITS WG5. We conclude that pseudonym-based solutions are considered the most practical and promising privacy protection mechanisms in VANETs and focus on them in our work.

In [3], we analyze the specifics of VANETs and what requirements this creates for privacy solutions. We also carry out a broad review of current proposals in the light of those requirements. While basic schemes work as described in the introduction, more advanced schemes try to reduce the created overhead, e.g., with self-signed certificates [4]. Self-signed certificates create a Sybil attack problem as one cannot limit the amount of pseudonyms a vehicle controls. A recent approach tries to contain this problem [5]. [6] proposes a scheme that enforces collaborative identity resolution. However, resolution authorities need to participate in pseudonym issuance which is not desirable. Ideally, we would prefer a strict separation of concerns so that each entity in our system model has a clear task and can be implemented independently of other functionality.

III. SYSTEM MODEL

Our system model is based on the SeVeCom system model [1]. A vehicle V is identifiable by a unique long-term identifier id_V , e.g., an identity certificate and the corresponding key pair. V is registered with an authority CA_h , its home CA identified by id_{CA_h} . CA_h manages V 's virtual identity and issued id_V . In practice, a regional vehicle registration authority could take on this role, thus consolidating authority over V 's virtual identity and physical license plates.

V can obtain pseudonyms P_i from pseudonym providers PP_k . Pseudonym providers are independent from CA_h so that V can engage with arbitrary PP_k . Before new P_i are issued, V is authenticated and it is verified that V has not been revoked. A pseudonym P_i is a public key certificate for a key pair (PK_{P_i}, SK_{P_i}) , containing no information linking P_i to V or any P_j ($j \neq i$). When communicating, V signs messages with secret key SK_{P_i} of the current pseudonym P_i . The signature and P_i are attached to the message for verification by receivers.

The resolution authorities RA_l take part in pseudonym-identity resolution. A subset of them has to cooperate in the process. RA_l should be independent from authorities involved in the issuance of a pseudonym.

IV. EMBEDDING IDENTITIES IN PSEUDONYMS

Our approach is based on the idea of embedding resolution information directly in pseudonym certificates rather than

Authentication phase:

$$V \longrightarrow CA_h : (id_V, req, \sigma_V(req)) \quad (1)$$

$$V \longleftarrow CA_h : (id, PK_{RA}, id_{CA_h}, exp, n) \quad (2)$$

$$V : \mathcal{V}_i = E_{PK_{RA}}(id \parallel r_i) \quad (3)$$

$$V : C_i = (m_i)^{b_i} = (\mathcal{V}_i \parallel exp \parallel id_{CA_h})^{b_i} \quad (4)$$

$$V \longrightarrow CA_h : (C_1, \dots, C_n) \quad (5)$$

$$V \longleftarrow CA_h : \mathcal{I} \quad (6)$$

$$V \longrightarrow CA_h : \{(b_i^{-1}, r_i) \mid i \in \mathcal{I}\} \quad (7)$$

$$CA_h : (C_i)^{b_i^{-1}} = (m_i)^{b_i b_i^{-1}} = m_i \quad (8)$$

$$CA_h : m_i \stackrel{?}{=} (E_{PK_{RA}}(id \parallel r_i) \parallel exp \parallel id_{CA_h}) \quad (9)$$

$$V \longleftarrow CA_h : \{\sigma_{CA_h}(C_j) \mid j \notin \mathcal{I}\} \quad (10)$$

$$V : (\sigma_{CA_h}(C_j))^{b_j^{-1}} = \sigma_{CA_h}(m_j) \\ = \sigma_{CA_h}(\mathcal{V}_j \parallel exp \parallel id_{CA_h}) \quad (11)$$

Acquisition phase:

$$V \xrightarrow{*} PP : E_{PK_{PP}}(\mathcal{V}_i, exp, id_{CA_h}, \\ \sigma_{CA_h}(\mathcal{V}_i \parallel exp \parallel id_{CA_h}), PK_{P_i}, \sigma_{P_i}(\circ)) \quad (12)$$

$$PP : P_i = (PK_{P_i}, \mathcal{V}_i, exp_{P_i}, id_{PP}; \sigma_{PP}(\circ)) \quad (13)$$

$$V \xleftarrow{*} PP : P_i \quad (14)$$

Fig. 1. Pseudonym issuance protocol.

having authorities store them. id_V , id_{CA_h} , and a unique randomization factor r are encrypted with PK_{RA} , the commonly known public key of the resolution authorities. Resulting ciphertexts, we call them \mathcal{V} -tokens, are unlinkable. For randomized encryption schemes, like ElGamal, r is implicitly part of the encryption scheme, while r must be explicitly included for deterministic encryption schemes, like RSA.

Pseudonyms with embedded \mathcal{V} -tokens are issued in a two phase protocol, which ensures that \mathcal{V} -token content is valid but prevents issuing authorities from linking pseudonyms to vehicles (see Sec. IV-A). V uses the resulting pseudonym P_i for normal message authentication by signing messages with SK_{P_i} and attaching P_i to the message. Receivers verify P_i and the signature. Thus, embedding the \mathcal{V} -token in P_i does not affect how P_i is used in communications.

If required, pseudonym-identity resolution is performed collaboratively by a minimum number of authorities. They need to jointly decrypt the \mathcal{V} -token embedded in a P_i to retrieve the linking information. Sec. IV-B details the resolution protocol.

A. Privacy-preserving Pseudonym Issuance

The privacy-preserving issuance protocol employs a blind signature scheme to prevent issuing authorities from learning linking information. In the *authentication phase*, V first obtains blindly signed \mathcal{V} -tokens from CA_h . Subsequently, \mathcal{V} -tokens are used in the *acquisition phase* to obtain pseudonyms from a pseudonym provider PP . The full protocol is given in Fig. 1 and is detailed in the following.

¹PRIME website: <http://www.prime-project.eu/>

²SeVeCom website: <http://www.sevecom.org/>

³PREDRIVE-C2X website: <http://www.pre-drive-c2x.eu/>

1) *Authentication phase*: The authentication phase between V and CA_h results in one or more \mathcal{V} -tokens blindly signed by CA_h . The protocol description has been generalized to remain independent from a specific signature scheme. We only assume that a blind signature extension exists for the signing algorithm, as is the case for RSA [7] or EC-ElGamal [8]. An abstract notation is used for blinding operations. $(m)^b$ indicates a message m blinded with blinding factor b , and unblinding is represented by $((m)^b)^{b^{-1}} = m$ with b^{-1} being the corresponding unblinding factor. Actual blinding and unblinding operations depend on the employed blind signature scheme and may consist of multiple steps.

We step through the protocol in the following. In (1) V sends a \mathcal{V} -token request req to CA_h signed with SK_V to prove identity id_V . The structure of req depends on the chosen authentication scheme and may entail further message exchange. (2) CA_h verifies the signature $\sigma_V(req)$ with V 's public key PK_V and checks internally that V has not been revoked. CA_h then returns to V the composed identifier $id = id_{CA_h} \parallel id_V$ to be included in the \mathcal{V} -token, the public key of the resolution authorities PK_{RA} , id_{CA_h} , expiration date exp , and requests n commitments. The expiration date exp is set to a discrete value, e.g., midnight or last day of the week, to prevent linking based on individualized exp .

V verifies that id is correct. Then, (3) V creates n \mathcal{V} -tokens \mathcal{V}_i by choosing a unique random r_i that is appended to id , before encrypting it with PK_{RA} . exp and id_{CA_h} are appended to each \mathcal{V}_i . The expiration date limits the lifetime of a \mathcal{V} -token. id_{CA_h} is required for verification purposes later in the acquisition phase. (4) V then chooses n random distinct blinding factors b_i , with inverse b_i^{-1} . Each m_i is blinded, resulting in commitments $C_i = (\mathcal{V}_i)^{b_i}$. (5) V sends C_1, \dots, C_n to CA_h , and stores the corresponding b_i^{-1} and r_i .

Now, V is committed to the content encoded in all C_i in the sense that it cannot manipulate or change the content anymore. V has to prove probabilistically to CA_h that the encoded content contains id as provided by CA_h in (2). As part of the commitment scheme, CA_h asks V to reveal the content of some random C_i . For this purpose, (6) CA_h randomly chooses $h \geq n/2$ commitments C_i and requests the corresponding b_i^{-1} and r_i . The selected indices i are organized in the indices set \mathcal{I} which is sent to V . (7) V sends b_i^{-1} and r_i , $i \in \mathcal{I}$, to CA_h . Now, CA_h can verify the content of \mathcal{V}_i by first (8) unblinding the commitments C_i with b_i^{-1} to obtain m_i ($i \in \mathcal{I}$). Then, (9) CA_h computes the corresponding \mathcal{V} -token with r_i . The result has to be compared to m_i . If all unblinded m_i are correct, the remaining $n - h$ commitments C_j ($j \notin \mathcal{I}$) are also correct except for an exponentially small probability, i.e., the probability that V managed to cheat is negligible. This is due to V not knowing which C_i will be unblinded later when it creates the commitments, and not being able to change them when CA_h selects the commitments to be opened. See [9] for a formal analysis of the security of commitment schemes. By adjusting the ratio of $h : n$, CA_h can control the cheating probability in trade-off with required overhead.

(10) CA_h signs the remaining commitments C_j with its

secret key SK_{CA_h} , yielding $n - h$ blind signatures $\sigma_{CA_h}(C_j)$ which are sent to V . In the last step, (11) V unblinds each $\sigma_{CA_h}(C_j)$ by applying the corresponding b_j^{-1} ($j \notin \mathcal{I}$). This way, V obtains $n - h$ \mathcal{V} -tokens \mathcal{V}_j , each encrypted with PK_{RA} and signed by CA_h .

2) *Acquisition phase*: Once in possession of signed \mathcal{V} -tokens, V interacts with a pseudonym providers PP_k to obtain a pseudonym P_i for each signed \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i . The signed \mathcal{V} -token is used as an anonymous authentication credential. It implicitly certifies that its owner has been authenticated successfully by CA_h , identified by id_{CA_h} . To ensure the anonymity of V when interacting with PP and to ensure unlinkability between resulting pseudonyms and V , an anonymous communication channel is required between the two parties (denoted by $\xrightarrow{*}$). Either V uses a previously issued pseudonym to communicate anonymously or an anonymization mechanism like onion routing [10] can be used.

The acquisition phase starts with (12) V generating a new key pair (PK_{P_i}, SK_{P_i}) as a pseudonym key pair. Here, the key generator function of the signature scheme for VANET authentication is used. V stores SK_{P_i} securely. V sends a pseudonym certification request to PP containing PK_{P_i} and a signed \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i (including exp and id_{CA_h}). V signs the request with SK_{P_i} to prove its ownership. Hereby, $\sigma_{P_i}(\circ)$ indicates a signature over a whole message. The request is further encrypted with PK_{PP} .

PP decrypts the request and verifies $\sigma_{P_i}(\circ)$. PP checks the validity of the presented \mathcal{V} -token by verifying signature $\sigma_{CA_h}(\dots)$ with CA_h 's well-known public key PK_{CA_h} , identified by id_{CA_h} . If valid, PP proceeds by checking that \mathcal{V}_i has not expired and has not been used before (see Sec. IV-A3). If all checks succeed, (13) PP includes the plain \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i (without σ_{CA_h} , exp , and id_{CA_h}) in a pseudonym certificate P_i for PK_{P_i} . P_i also contains an expiration date exp_{P_i} and id_{PP} . (14) PP sends P_i to V . V can now use P_i for message authentication.

We only showed the acquisition of one pseudonym. V can repeat the acquisition phase for each \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i previously obtained. V can also acquire pseudonyms from different pseudonym providers PP by engaging with multiple PP_s in the acquisition phase. This can be advantageous in a region where a specific pseudonym provider is dominant, i.e., it issued the majority of pseudonyms used in that region. While V may usually use pseudonyms of its preferred provider PP_a it can obtain pseudonyms from PP_b to prevent *sticking out* when travelling through a region dominated by PP_b . In theory, this issue could be avoided by only allowing one pseudonym provider in the system. However, in practical systems it can be expected that several pseudonym providers will exist, e.g., in different countries.

3) *Double spending prevention*: The issuance protocol enables V to obtain pseudonyms anonymously from different pseudonym providers, but V could present one signed \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i to multiple PP_k to obtain more pseudonyms than it has signed \mathcal{V} -tokens. Pseudonyms containing the same \mathcal{V}_i would be trivially linkable, but by using them at different

spatiotemporal positions linking could be rendered unlikely. Double spending, i.e., multiple use of tokens, is a well-known problem of electronic cash and credential systems [11].

Double spending of \mathcal{V} -tokens can be prevented by extending pseudonym provider functionality. Pseudonym providers can operate a distributed \mathcal{V} -token clearing house CH in which hash values of used \mathcal{V} -tokens are stored. In step (13), PP additionally computes $H(\mathcal{V}_i)$ and queries CH for it. $H(\mathcal{V}_i)$ is rejected if it is already in CH and added to it otherwise. Optionally, exp could be stored with $H(\mathcal{V}_i)$ to enable automated deletion of expired entries. Storing only hash values in CH instead of actual \mathcal{V} -tokens reduces storage size and ensures that CH does not contain any (encrypted) linking information. CH could be realized as a distributed hash table (DHT) to provide scalable lookups.

B. Collaborative Identity Resolution

While identity resolution is part of conditional pseudonymity to prevent misuse and abuse of a system, it also exposes users to potential privacy infringement. Therefore, the information required for identity resolution needs to be protected properly, so that it is only available to some authorities in very specific situations. Separation of duties is a common principle to prevent intentional or unintentional misuse of information or processes. We apply separation of duties to the protection of identity resolution information. For this purpose, we distribute the ability to perform identity resolution between a number of authorities and enforce their collaboration to perform identity resolution with a threshold encryption scheme.

In our system, identity resolution corresponds to the decryption of a \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i embedded in a pseudonym P_i to obtain id_V that links P_i to vehicle V . The secret key of the resolution authorities SK_{RA} is split among n resolution authorities, so that each holds only a share of SK_{RA} . Cooperation of a subset of k of n RAs is required to decrypt a \mathcal{V} -token, which has been encrypted with PK_{RA} .

For protocol description, we assume three resolution authorities: a law enforcement agency L , a judge or juridical institution J , and a data protection agency DP . L wants to identify the sender of a message with pseudonym P_i , J decides if evidence provided by L is sufficient to justify identity resolution, and DP surveys privacy breaches. We will discuss later how the protocol can be extended for more complex scenarios. It is assumed that a common public key PK_{RA} has been published and that the secret key SK_{RA} has been divided into three shares SK_{RA}^L, SK_{RA}^J , and SK_{RA}^{DP} . We use a $(3, 3)$ -threshold scheme, i.e., all three shares need to be applied to successfully decrypt a \mathcal{V} -token $\mathcal{V}_i = E_{PK_{RA}}(id \parallel r_i)$. The use of secret sharing homomorphisms [12] and a homomorphic encryption scheme, e.g., ElGamal [13], enable homomorphic threshold decryption that prevents SK_{RA} or its shares from being disclosed in the decryption process. Each party applies its secret share to \mathcal{V}_i , and only when the k -th entity applies its secret share, $E_{PK}(m)$ is decrypted.

The input for identity resolution is a pseudonym certificate P_i containing a \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i , for which L is convinced that

$$L \longrightarrow J : (\mathcal{V}_i, \mathfrak{E}_i) \quad (1)$$

$$J : \mathcal{V}_i^J = D_{SK_{RA}^J}(\mathcal{V}_i) \quad (2)$$

$$L \longleftarrow J : (\mathcal{V}_i^J, \sigma_J(\mathfrak{E}_i)) \quad (3)$$

$$L \longrightarrow DP : (\mathcal{V}_i^J, \mathfrak{E}_i, \sigma_J(\mathfrak{E}_i)) \quad (4)$$

$$DP : \mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP} = D_{SK_{RA}^{DP}}(\mathcal{V}_i^J) \quad (5)$$

$$L \longleftarrow DP : (\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP}) \quad (6)$$

$$L : \mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP,L} = D_{SK_{RA}^L}(\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP}) \quad (7)$$

$$= D_{SK_{RA}^L}(D_{SK_{RA}^{DP}}(D_{SK_{RA}^J}(\mathcal{V}_i)))$$

$$= D_{SK_{RA}}(E_{PK_{RA}}(id))$$

$$= id = id_{CA_h} \parallel id_V$$

$$L \longrightarrow CA_h : (id) \quad (8)$$

$$L \longleftarrow CA_h : info_V \quad (9)$$

Fig. 2. Collaborative identity resolution protocol with 3 authorities.

resolution is justified. L collects supporting evidence in the evidence set \mathfrak{E}_i . Fig. 2 gives all steps of the protocol which are now discussed in detail.

First, (1) L extracts \mathcal{V}_i from P_i and gathers evidence \mathfrak{E}_i . L forwards \mathcal{V}_i and \mathfrak{E}_i to J with a request for identity resolution. (2) J assesses \mathfrak{E}_i and either supports or declines identity resolution on basis of the provided evidence. If J supports resolution, it decrypts \mathcal{V}_i with partial secret SK_{RA}^J . J also signs \mathfrak{E}_i to certify its approval for identity resolution. This is optional but can serve for audit purposes. (3) \mathcal{V}_i^J and $\sigma_J(\mathfrak{E}_i)$ are returned to L . Note that as long as \mathcal{V}_i has been *decrypted* by less than $k - 1$ RAs , no information about the plaintext is revealed.

Next, (4) L forwards \mathcal{V}_i^J and the evidence signed by J to DP . DP verifies $\sigma_J(\mathfrak{E}_i)$ with J 's well-known public key PK_J . If the signature is valid, DP can either trust J 's assessment of \mathfrak{E}_i or perform its own assessment of the evidence. (5) If DP decides to support identity resolution, it decrypts \mathcal{V}_i^J with its partial secret SK_{RA}^{DP} . (6) DP returns $\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP}$ to L .

Now, (7) L can apply its own secret share SK_{RA}^L to $\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP}$ yielding $\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP,L}$. The threshold $k = 3$ is reached, thus, $\mathcal{V}_i^{J,DP,L}$ equals the decrypted plaintext identifier id . Note, that only L learns the linking information id because it applies its secret share last.

(8) Based on id , L can contact the regional CA (CA_h) responsible for the long-term identity id_V to request further information about vehicle V . CA_h looks up id_V in its database and returns information about V to L . If required, CA_h can revoke V 's long-term identity to prevent V from obtaining new \mathcal{V} -tokens in an additional step.

L has successfully linked pseudonym P_i to vehicle V and has sufficient information to hold V accountable. The protocol provides a straightforward approach for identity resolution with enforced distribution of resolution authority. It is also

extensible and flexible. For example, the order in which entities apply their secret share is irrelevant as long as the k -th entity is the one that should learn the plaintext. We used a simplified scenario with only three RAs to outline the protocol, but hierarchical secret sharing schemes exist [14] that can model multilevel hierarchies with different threshold values for different subtrees. Such a scheme can be instantiated to reflect the external and internal organizational structure of RAs and how secret shares are distributed and divided further.

Another aspect to consider is the initial computation of the key pair (PK_{RA}, SK_{RA}) and splitting of SK_{RA} , which should not rely on a trusted party. Instead, a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol, such as in [15], should be used that allows participating RAs to jointly compute (PK_{RA}, SK_{RA}) and individual secret shares, without revealing SK_{RA} in the process. The setup of an MPC scheme for key initialization is out of scope of this work.

V. ANALYSIS

Our analysis focuses on the protocols' ability to resist security and privacy attacks. We have identified two general categories of potential attacks. In a *repudiation attack*, V tries to cheat the issuance protocol in order to evade accountability. In a *linking attack*, other entities aim to link pseudonyms or \mathcal{V} -tokens to V or each other. We assume that adversaries participating in the issuance or resolution protocol behaves semi-honest, i.e., adhere to defined protocol steps. Thus, denial of service attacks are excluded in the following. For linking attacks, we additionally assume that the adversary does not have access to V 's sensitive key material. This also includes \mathcal{V} -tokens signed by CA_h . This assumption can be realized in practical systems by storing such data in a tamper-resistant hardware security module in the vehicle [1].

A. Repudiation Attacks

Vehicle V could try to mount a repudiation attack with the aim of evading non-repudiation. Thus, the attack goal is to prevent that correct identity information is embedded in pseudonyms in the issuance protocol (see Fig. 1).

In the authentication phase, V could try to include a wrong identifier in \mathcal{V}_i in step (3). This is prevented by the commitment scheme [9], which ensures that CA_h would detect a wrong identifier with exponentially large probability in step (9). At the same time, it is not possible for CA_h to include a wrong identifier because V generates the \mathcal{V} -token itself.

In the acquisition phase, V could try to submit an arbitrary bitstring instead of a \mathcal{V} -token to PP , or a real \mathcal{V} -token extracted from a pseudonym of another vehicle. Both attacks would not be successful, because PP requires a valid signature by a CA, i.e., CA_h , on a \mathcal{V} -token to accept it. \mathcal{V} -tokens that have already been embedded in a pseudonym do not carry a CA signature any more and would also be detected by querying the distributed clearinghouse in (13) (see Fig. 1).

B. Linking Attacks

In a linking attack, an adversary tries to link pseudonyms or \mathcal{V} -tokens to their respective holder, i.e., vehicle V . Adversaries

in a linking attack can either be entities actively participating in the issuance or resolution protocols or external entities not involved in the protocols. Note, that linking attacks based on vehicle tracking are out of scope of this work.

An external adversary may perform a linking attack in order to infer vehicle movement patterns, which afterwards could be combined with further external information that enables inference of the vehicle identity. By definition, pseudonym certificates contain no linkable information. Encoded public keys and certificate identifiers are generated randomly. Pseudonyms can also not be linked based on \mathcal{V} -tokens embedded in them, due to the randomization factor r , which ensures that \mathcal{V} -token ciphertexts are randomized and unlinkable. However, id_{PP} could facilitate linking of pseudonyms if V successively uses pseudonyms issued by one PP , in a region where most vehicles use pseudonyms issued by another PP . As discussed before, this can be thwarted by obtaining pseudonyms from multiple providers or from the PP most dominant in a specific region. Thus, vehicle V can control the success likelihood of such a linking attack by its choice of PP for a given context.

Potential linking attacks that involve protocol participants are discussed separately per protocol.

1) *During pseudonym issuance:* In the pseudonym issuance protocol, CA_h , PP , or both could act as adversaries. We can analyze what information each party learns during protocol execution by defining their respective knowledge sets $K(CA_h)$ and $K(PP)$. CA_h knows id_V because it maintains V 's information. It learns the opened commitments, which however do not contain new information. The blind signature scheme in steps (4)-(11) prevents CA_h from learning which \mathcal{V} -tokens it signed. So at the end of the acquisition phase the knowledge set of CA_h , with $i \in \mathcal{I}$, is

$$K(CA_h) = \{id_{CA_h}, id_V, req, id, exp, C_1, \dots, C_n, m_i\}.$$

PP learns the presented \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i and the pseudonym P_i it issues, but not id_V :

$$K(PP) = \{id_{PP}, \mathcal{V}_i, exp, id_{CA_h}, exp_{P_i}, P_i\}.$$

Further, we define the identity set $I(V) = \{id_V\}$ and the anonymity set $A(V) = \{\mathcal{V}_i, P_i\}$ for vehicle V . An adversary can only link a pseudonym to V if it knows at least one item from $I(V)$ and one from $A(V)$ after protocol execution. Thus, to prevent linking the following condition must be fulfilled:

$$K(X) \cap I(V) = \emptyset \vee K(X) \cap A(V) = \emptyset.$$

This holds true for CA_h and also for PP :

$$\begin{aligned} K(CA_h) \cap I(V) &= I(V), & K(CA_h) \cap A(V) &= \emptyset \\ K(PP) \cap I(V) &= \emptyset, & K(PP) \cap A(V) &= A(V). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, neither CA_h nor PP can link P_i and id_V on their own. We can further show that linking is not possible even if CA_h and PP collude. Because authentication and acquisition phase are decoupled, a shared information set between CA_h and PP would be required for linking:

$$K(CA_h) \cap K(PP) = \{id_{CA_h}, exp\}.$$

Thus, CA_h and PP could only encode linking information in id_{CA_h} and exp . Although CA_h originally specifies id_{CA_h} and exp in the authentication phase, V can ultimately verify them in step (4). V can prevent CA_h from issuing traceable \mathcal{V} -tokens by requiring a fixed identifier id_{CA_h} and that exp adheres to a fixed expiration scheme, e.g., noon, midnight, or end of the week. Therefore, the pseudonym issuance protocol is robust against linking attacks by any of the involved parties.

2) *During identity resolution*: The identity resolution protocol is flexible in terms of definition and structure of secret sharing schemes and thresholds in order to be adjusted to organizational requirements. Participants of the secret sharing scheme should be selected in a way that reduces incentives for collusion, e.g., because of inherently divergent interests. We assume that participants have been chosen in a way that results in a negligible probability of a collusion of $\geq k$ parties, for decryption threshold k .

Returning to our example from Sec. IV-B with authorities L , J , and DP and $k = 3$, it is apparent that no information about the content of \mathcal{V} -token \mathcal{V}_i is revealed until all parties applied their secret shares and the threshold is reached. By analyzing the knowledge sets after protocol execution of each party, we see that J and DP do not gain information about V through execution of the protocol:

$$K(L) = \{P_i, \mathcal{V}_i, \mathfrak{C}_i, id_V, info_V\}, K(J) = K(DP) = \{\mathcal{V}_i, \mathfrak{C}_i\}$$

Thus, J and DP can participate in the protocol without learning id . Only L learns the content of \mathcal{V}_i , but this is the aim of the protocol. The protocol cannot prevent L from sharing id with other parties after resolution. But this is an inherent problem of any protocol in which sensitive information needs to be revealed, e.g., credit card transactions.

When L and CA_h exchange information in steps (8) and (9) (see Fig. 2), P_i and \mathcal{V}_i have already been linked to V , as is the purpose of the protocol. However, neither L nor CA_h gain direct information about any other P_j or \mathcal{V}_k ($j, k \neq i$) belonging to V . Therefore, perfect forward privacy [3] is achieved, i.e., the resolution of one pseudonym to an identity does not facilitate linking of other pseudonyms of that user.

What is left to analyze is if it is feasible for an entity that knows id_V and PK_{RA} , e.g., L or CA_h , to compute all possible \mathcal{V} -tokens for vehicle V with an exhaustive search over r . The purpose would be tracking of a single vehicle V by linking the P_i and \mathcal{V}_i to V . In the case that id_V and PK_{RA} are known to the adversary, the security of the \mathcal{V} -token depends on the bitsize of the randomization factor r . By choosing r sufficiently large, such an attack is rendered infeasible. But larger r entail larger \mathcal{V} -tokens and pseudonyms and, thus, a tradeoff between security and communication costs is required. Due to space limitations, we will provide an analysis of this attack and tradeoff in future work.

VI. CONCLUSION

The outlined approach for conditional pseudonymity in vehicular networks does not require pseudonym-identity mappings to achieve accountability. Instead, resolution information

is embedded as encrypted unlinkable \mathcal{V} -tokens in pseudonym certificates. As a result, the privacy of vehicles is enhanced in multiple ways. No authorities need to be trusted to protect privacy sensitive resolution information, identity resolution requires the cooperation of several authorities in order to be successful, and perfect forward privacy is provided. At the same time, authorities can still determine the identity of a pseudonym holder when necessary, but without the need to manage large amounts of critical information requiring secure storage and protection. With our \mathcal{V} -token approach, each vehicle carries its own resolution information, thus, also providing a scalability advantage.

We have also shown that the issuance and resolution protocols are resistant against repudiation and linking attacks. The security of \mathcal{V} -tokens can be controlled but entails a tradeoff with communication costs. In future work, we will provide an extended analysis of this tradeoff. We are also currently evaluating with simulations how the additional overhead of embedded \mathcal{V} -tokens in pseudonyms affects inter-vehicular communications in scenarios with varying traffic density. As a future extension, we also plan to include pseudonym revocation in our scheme.

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